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Abstract: As China has rapidly emerged as one of the world’s largest investors 
abroad, there has been a hectic debate in the literature on whether its emergence as a 
major foreign investor may have undermined the importance of western industrialised 
economies, including those in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). This paper aims to investigate whether this is the case. The 
study uses a panel dataset covering 155 countries, including 33 in the OECD, where 
China had invested during 2003-09. This is by far the most comprehensive dataset of 
China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). A two-stage least squared (TSLS) 
regression approach is adopted for our econometric models according to an 
established augmented gravity model in the literature. The empirical results show 
clear evidence that China’s OFDI displaces that of the OECD countries, but the 
argument that China’s emergence is a ‘new colonialism’ is not supported as OECD 
countries’ OFDI in  resource abundant host countries, particularly that in Africa and 
Latin America, does not appear to have been displaced by China’s OFDI. 
 
Key words: outward FDI, displacement effect, China, OECD 
JEL: F21, O57 
 
*Shujie Yao is professor of economics and Chinese sustainable development, head of the School of 
Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Nottingham; and special chair professor of economics, 
Xi’an Jiaotong University, China. Pan Wang is a sales executive at the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
1.  Introduction 
 
China’s outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) have grown exponentially over 
recent years (Figure 1). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) has reported that China will become the second largest FDI source 
country after the US before 2015. 
 
In 2010, China accounted for 5.1% of global FDI flows. It was ranked the 5
th
 largest 
foreign investor in the world and the largest among all the developing countries 
(MOFCOM, 2010). In that year, China’s total outward investments amounted to $69 
billion, accumulating total stock to $317 billion. 
 
Figure 1: China’s OFDI flow and stock values 1991-2010 ($ billion) 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
OFDI Stock OFDI Flow
 
Sources: Data for 1991-2002 are obtained from UNCTAD, World Investment Reports (various issues). 
Data for 2003-2010 are obtained from MOFCOM (2011), Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment.   
 
China’s rapid emergence as a major investor abroad has triggered increasing anxiety 
in the world (The Economist, 2008). In fact, China’s overseas investments may have a 
widespread impact on both host and home countries of FDI.  
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However, some FDI host countries have expressed concern over the expansion of 
China’s investments, made largely by its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose 
investment motivation may have a political component.  
 
As for the recipient countries of FDI, Chinese capital may well lead to displacement 
of their investments and intensify competition (The Economist, 2010). Rosen and 
Hanemann (2009) explicitly point out that China is capable of challenging the existing 
foreign investment pattern, resulting in a powerful impact on international politics and 
foreign relations. China’s Western rivals fear being crowded out of foreign markets 
because Chinese firms are backed by the government with low-cost credits and soft 
budget constraints seemingly without limits (Yao, et al., 2010). 
 
As the world’s dominant FDI source countries, members of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) may be the most affected by 
China’s rapid rise as a business superpower. 1  Outward investments by OECD 
countries grew at less than a quarter of China’s rate during the period 2003-2009.  
 
The key research question in this paper is whether China’s OFDI has had any 
displacement effect on that of other countries, especially those in the OECD. A 
preliminary examination of Figure 2 may show such evidence. The OFDI share of 
OECD countries in the global total decreased alongside an increase in China’s share.   
 
                                                 
1
 To illustrate the effect of China’s OFDI on the world, the OECD countries are selected for two 
reasons. First, the OECD has a rich dataset covering many bilateral investment flows between its 
member states and other countries, including China for a long period of time. Second, the OECD 
countries had an average share of 84% of the global OFDI during 2003–2009. 
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Figure 2: The share of OECD countries and China in world OFDI 
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Sources: China’s data are obtained from MOFCOM (2009). OECD country data are obtained from 
UNCTAD, World Investments Report (various issues). 
 
Whether this evidence is statistically significant requires much more careful 
econometric analysis, which is the main objective of this paper. In addition, the 
empirical models will help in identifying the key determinants of China’s OFDI and 
to differentiate its impact on the different kinds of host and home countries of foreign 
investments.  
 
Existing studies on China’s OFDI have mainly focused on locational determinants 
with limited data availability and over a relatively short period of time (Buckley et al., 
2008; Cheung and Qian, 2009). In terms of research methodology, Greenaway et al. 
(2008) find evidence of China’s exports having a displacement effect on those of 
other Asian countries.  
 
Following Greenaway et al. (2008), a panel dataset covering 155 countries, including 
33 in the OECD where China invested over 2003-09, is used to construct a gravity 
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model to achieve the research objectives outlined above. A two-stage least squared 
(TSLS) estimation approach is adopted to overcome the endogeneity problem that 
may be encountered by the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) method.  
 
The empirical results show that China’s OFDI does displace that of the OECD 
countries in a third country in general, but the finding depends on the validity of the 
instrumental variable (IV). This negative causal effect implies that a 10% rise in 
China’s OFDI leads to a more than 3% decrease in the OFDI of the OECD countries.  
 
Some sensitivity analysis and robustness tests are also carried out to investigate 
whether and how the displacement effects may vary in different kinds of host and 
home countries of FDI.  
 
It is interesting to find that contrary to the often-heard ‘new colonialism’ argument, 
China’s OFDI does not displace the OFDI of the OECD countries in oil and minerals 
(e.g., iron ores) abundant host countries or in Africa and Latin America. In contrast, 
the displacement effect in host countries that are less abundant in oil and minerals or 
located in Asia, Europe and North America is significant and positive.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the development of China’s 
OFDI. Section 3 introduces the basic model and discusses the data and regression 
techniques. Section 4 presents the regression results and their implications. Section 5 
carries out some robustness checks on the basic model. The final section concludes 
and discusses policy implications.  
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2 Background of China’s OFDI 
 
 
China has achieved great economic success since 1978. Its annual average growth rate 
of gross domestic product (GDP) was 9.9% during the period 1978-2009. By 2010, 
China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy and is now set to surpass 
the US to be the largest before 2025.  
 
Meanwhile, China’s foreign exchange reserves have increased rapidly, amounting to 
$3.2 trillion by 2011 (Figure 3).   
  
Figure 3: China’s GDP and foreign exchange reserves (US$, bil) 
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Data Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (various years). 
 
Fast economic development has raised China’s desire for advanced technology. The 
acquisition of IBM’s PC business is a stunning example, followed by the acquisition 
of Rover by Nanjing Auto and the acquisition of Volvo by Geely Auto. China’s 
foreign investments have also been extended to securing the supply of oil and other 
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resources from Australia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Russia and Central 
Asia.  
 
Although China is emerging as a significant source of OFDI, the development of its 
OFDI has a short history. In the initial stage, China’s OFDI was mainly motivated by 
political rather than economic incentives (Cheung and Qian, 2009; Voss et al., 2008). 
OFDI activities were promoted by both central and local administrations after Deng 
Xiaoping’s South Tour in 1992. The launch of the ‘Go Global’ policy in 2002 and 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 boosted overseas investments. The OFDI 
policy was further liberalised from an approval regime to a supervision and assistance 
regime by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).
2
  
 
The annual average growth rate of China’s OFDI was 71% during 2003-09, four times 
as high as the world average.
3
 Yao and Sutherland (2009) and Xiao and Sun (2005) 
point out that the rapid expansion of China’s OFDI was due to state policy to  
substantially subsidise state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through cheap credits and soft-
budget constraints to secure a long-term and stable supply of natural resources.  
 
China’s rising importance as a foreign investor has been interpreted as a threat rather 
than an opportunity to other countries in the West. The Economist (2008), for instance, 
claims that Chinese investments are undermining the West’s existing interests, and 
that China is stealing natural resources and colonising Africa.  
                                                 
2
 MOFCOM was established from the former the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC) in 2003.   
3
 The growth rates are calculated by the authors. Data of China’s OFDI are obtained from MOFCOM 
(2009). Data of the world’s OFDI are obtained from UNCTAD World Investment Report (various 
issues). 
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The following sections will answer the following questions: what are the 
consequences of China’s OFDI on the world economy? To what extent has China’s 
OFDI displaced that of the OECD countries?  
 
3. Methodology and models 
 
To examine the impact of China’s OFDI on the OFDI of OECD countries in a given 
host country, the basic gravity model includes the OFDI of OECD countries as the 
dependent variable and China’s OFDI as the main explanatory variable along with a 
set of control variables.  
 
The gravity model performs like a workhorse model for many empirical studies on 
bilateral economic relations, accounting for resistance and friction factors such as 
distance and language. This kind of model has been criticised for lacking a strong 
theoretical foundation ever since Tinbergen’s (1962) first application to an 
international trade study, even though it has strong explanatory power in empirical 
studies.  
 
Most studies have specified the gravity model intuitively, without formal 
identifications. Following Anderson (1979), an increasing number of studies have 
sought to explain the success of the gravity model (Bergstrand, 1985, 1989; Evenett 
and Keller, 2002; Deardorff, 1995; Helpman, 1987; Hummels and Levisohn, 1995).  
 
The gravity model has been applied in the study of the behaviour of China’s OFDI in 
Buckley et al. (2008), and Cheung and Qian (2009). Our benchmark gravity-type 
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specification is given in Equation (1), where 
1  represents the impact of China’s 
OFDI on the OFDI of OECD countries in a given host country. A negative value of 
1 represents a displacement effect, meaning that the OFDI of OECD countries 
declines following a rise in China’s OFDI. 
 
jitj
jijijiji
jijijijit
jtjtjt
jtitit
itititjit
Trend
SmctryDistContigComLag
ComcolColonyAreaExch
sourcesyTechnoRGDPPC
RGDPsourcesyTechno
RGDPPCRGDPCOFDIFOECDOFDIF












18
17161514
13121110
987
654
321
ln
lnln
Relogln
lnRelog
lnlnlnln
(1) 
 
In equation (1), j denotes a home (OECD) country, i a host country, and t year. 
OECDFDIFjit is FDI flow from j to i in t. itCOFDIF  is FDI flow from China to i in t. 
RGDP and RGDPPC are respectively real GDP and real GDP per capita. Technology 
means the technology level of i or j. Resources refers to whether i or j are resource 
rich. Exch is the bilateral real exchange rate. Area is the product of land areas of j and 
i. Colony takes 1 if i and j used to have a colonial relation and 0 otherwise. Comcol 
takes 1 if j and i were ever colonised by the same country and 0 otherwise. ComLag 
takes 1 if j and i share the same language and 0 otherwise. Contig takes 1 if j and i are 
contiguous and 0 otherwise. Disc is distance between j and i. Smctry takes 1 if j and i 
were ever the same country and 0 otherwise. jit is an error term. 
 
Real GDP is a proxy measure of market size. According to Dunning (1993, 1998), a 
larger GDP implies a bigger market and more business opportunities in a host country. 
An increase in a home country’s GDP implies a greater capability to invest abroad. 
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Following Braconier et al. (2002), the GDPs of both host and home countries are 
included in the model to distinguish their different characteristics. 
 
GDP per capita represents the level of economic development (Lipsey, 1999; Lane, 
2000; Dunning, 1981, 1995; Dunning et al., 2001). As a result, real GDP per capita of 
both home and host countries are included in the model to capture the market effects. 
  
China’s OFDI has a clear motivation in seeking foreign technologies and brands 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Mock et al., 2008). According to the OECD (2008), 
China also uses its technology as an advantage to invest in many African and other 
less developed countries.  
 
Many empirical studies (Driffield and Love, 2003; Fosfuri and Motta, 1999; Siotis, 
1999) have demonstrated that technology-seeking, or technology-exporting are two 
relevant motivations when investment decisions are made for both host and home 
countries. This is why our basic model includes variables representing the technology 
levels of both host and home countries.  
 
The basic model also includes variables that represent the level of resource 
endowments of both types of countries as these are considered important in some 
empirical studies (Zhan, 1995; Ye, 1992; Taylor, 2007).  
 
Gastanaga et al. (1998) and Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) emphasise the importance of 
natural resources in FDI analysis, as resource abundance can be a country-specific 
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advantage in attracting FDI (Dunning, 1993, 1998; Asiedu, 2006; Cheng and Ma, 
2007; Park, 2003).  
 
Following Cheung and Qian (2009) and Zhang (2009), the share of fuels, ores and 
metal exports in merchandise exports is used to represent the resource abundance of a 
host country.
4
   
 
The bilateral real exchange rates of OECD countries are included to control the host-
home country bilateral effect. The bilateral exchange rate is an important determinant 
of OFDI (Froot and Stein, 1991). Froot and Stein (1991) argue that internal financing 
is cheaper than external financing in an imperfect capital market, and the appreciation 
of home currency strengthens overseas activities. Goldberg and Klein (1998) indicate 
that depreciation of host country currency would attract more investment, because 
operation costs are lower and capital return higher.  
 
Other researchers argue that appreciation of home country currency may reduce OFDI. 
Cushman (1985) and Summary and Summary (1995) argue that if a home country’s 
subsidiaries need to import intermediate goods from the home country, currency 
appreciation in the home country would make imports more expensive and thus 
reduce OFDI. Goldberg and Klein (1998) also indicate that the depreciation of a home 
country’s currency increases OFDI along the lines of a similar argument.  
 
A wide range of variables are used to measure host-home country bilateral economic 
friction, including distance, colonial relation, common languages and so on. 
                                                 
4
 Kolstad and Wiig (2009) illustrated the reasons why natural resources export share was a better proxy 
than natural resources endowments.  
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Standard panel estimations rest on a strong assumption of exogeneity and estimations 
are unbiased only if explanatory variables are exogenous. This assumption is 
challenged if the explanatory variables are not exogenous.  
 
In this study, unobserved determinants left in the error term may simultaneously affect 
the OFDI of the OECD countries and China’s OFDI in a third country. This means 
that OLS estimations may be spurious due to an omitted variable bias.  
 
To correct this endogeneity bias, an instrumental variable (IV) estimation approach, or 
a two stage least squared (TSLS) method, is adopted in the regressions. In the first 
stage, exogenous IVs are included to estimate the predicted value of an endogenous 
variable, namely, China’s OFDI in the host country. The standard TSLS technique 
includes not only the IVs but also all explanatory variables in the first stage regression.  
 
The predicted value of China’s OFDI is included in the second stage regression to 
obtain consistent estimators. The IV estimator is less efficient than a conventional 
estimator and the TSLS estimation is redundant if the suspicious independent variable 
is in fact exogenous. Therefore, an endogeneity test should be conducted first before 
the TSLS method is applied.  
 
Selection of IVs 
 
The precision of TSLS estimation lies in the appropriateness of IVs. An appropriate 
IV should not only be econometrically valid but also economically justifiable. The 
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question here remains whether the causal effect of China’s OFDI on OECD’s OFDI, 
after controlling for a heterogeneity bias, connects to the relation between China’s 
OFDI and IVs.  
 
Following Greenaway et al. (2008), the logarithm of China’s distance to a third 
country (lnChinaDisti) is selected as the first IV. The logarithm of China’s bilateral 
real exchange rate with a third country (lnChinaExchit) is selected as the second IV to 
instrument China’s OFDI. The advantage of selecting lnChinaExchit as an IV is that 
its value changes with the host country as well as with time, unlike Greenaway et al. 
(2008) and Eichengreen et al. (2007), who select China’s GDP, which only changes 
with time.  
 
First IV: China’s distance to a third country (lnChinaDist) 
 
The relationship between China’s OFDI in a host country and its distance from China 
could be negative or positive. Buckley and Casson (1981) illustrate that OFDI 
increases with distance. In contrast, Zhang (2009) and Buckley et al. (2007) find that 
OFDI decreases with distance. Figure 4 provides a scatter plot of China’s OFDI and 
distance to a third country. It reveals that a rise in China’s distance to a third country 
implies an increasing cost of investment and hence a decline in OFDI. 
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Figure 4: The relationship between China’s OFDI and the distance to a third country 
Note: Regression results are significant at the 1% level. 
Data sources: MOFCOM (2009) and CEPII Distance Database (2010). 
 
Second IV: China’s bilateral real exchange rate (lnChinaExch) 
 
The second IV is included to overidentify the IVs’ coefficients; otherwise exact 
justification implies that IV’s exogeneity cannot be tested.  
 
China’s bilateral real exchange rate is defined as the number of units of a host 
country’s currency per Chinese RMB, meaning that a rise in its value implies RMB 
appreciation, and vice versa. 
 
The relationship between the bilateral exchange rate and FDI has been well 
documented from the position of three aspects: change, volatility and expectation of 
the bilateral exchange rate.  
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The first strand of literature examines the impact of home country currency 
appreciation and host country currency depreciation on FDI flows (Froot and Stein, 
1991; Klein and Rosengren, 1994 and Blonigen, 1997). The second strand of literature 
investigates the response of FDI flows to exchange rate volatility, especially when a 
currency is in crisis (Lipsey, 2001; Desai et al., 2004). The final strand of literature 
studies the response of FDI flows to an expected change in exchange rates (Campa, 
1993; Goldberg and Kolstad, 1995).  
 
Whether China’s bilateral real exchange rate is an appropriate IV is further justified 
by its relevance and exogeneity. Being a relevant IV, China’s bilateral real exchange 
rate should have a close relationship with OFDI. Figure 5 provides a scatter plot of 
these two variables, showing a plausible correlation. A rise in the real exchange rate 
implies RMB’s appreciation, resulting from an increase in OFDI.  
 
Figure 5: Relation between China’s bilateral real exchange rate and OFDI 
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lnCOFDIF=2.09+0.09lnChinaExch
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Notes: China’s bilateral real exchange rates with host countries are calculated by the authors. 
Regression results are significant at the 1% level. 
Data sources: MOFCOM (2009) and World Bank’s World Development Indicators (various years). 
 
Exogeneity of the selected IV implies no correlation between the real change rate and 
the OFDI of the OECD countries. However, this exclusion restriction might be 
violated if the IV is correlated with other unobserved factors which also affect the 
OFDI of OECD countries. For example, if the US dollar depreciates against Chinese 
RMB, it also depreciates against the host country’s currency at the same time. 
Therefore, the IV is only valid when the exclusion restriction assumption holds and 
the result obtained crucially depends on the assumption of the IV’s validity. 
 
To account for this possibility, this study controls for the logarithm of the OECD’s 
real exchange rate with a third country (lnExch) in Equation (1). In addition, China’s 
foreign exchange reforms in 2005 serve as an exogenous shock which improves the 
instrument’s exogeneity, because the change in China’s exchange rate policy should 
have little impact on an OECD country’s exchange rate with the host country. 
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In short, the distance from China to a third country and the real exchange rate between 
Chinese RMB and a third country’s currency are valid IVs. Their validity is supported 
by a series of statistical tests. A sufficiently large first-stage F-statistic indicates that 
the IVs are exogeneous. The Kleibergen-Paap rk test provides an additional check for 
under-identification, a strong rejection implying that the IVs are relevant. The failure 
to reject the Hansen overidentification test ensures that the IVs are uncorrelated with 
residuals, confirming their exogeneity. 
 
Data and empirical models 
 
The bilateral country-level OFDI data for the OECD countries are obtained from the 
OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database. China’s bilateral country-
level OFDI data are obtained from the Ministry of Commerce Statistical Bulletin of 
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.  
 
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators provide data for the following 
variables: (1) Real GDP and real GDP per capita for both home and host countries, 
which are deflated to constant 2000 US dollar prices; (2) Technology and resource 
abundance; (3) Bilateral real exchange rates. Data for distance, land area, whether a 
country is landlocked, colonial links, common coloniser, common language, same 
country and contiguity are collected from the CEPII Distances Database.  
 
A panel dataset of OFDI flows between 155 host countries and 33 OECD home 
countries during 2003–2009 is constructed. All the host and home countries are listed 
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in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A. Mexico is dropped from the home country list 
because of missing data.  
 
The dataset is cleaned using three criteria: (1) omitting observations with negative or 
missing data; (2) omitting data from the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Hong 
Kong and Macao, which are subject to ‘round tripping’; (3) the dependent variable, 
the OFDI of OECD countries, is winsorised at 1% using the two tails of the 
distribution. Winsorisation is a systematic approach to remove outliers and so any 
observation beyond the computed critical value is deleted. The cleaned dataset 
includes 9,283 observations or 76% of all the original observations without cleaning. 
 
The summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 1, including OECD’s 
OFDI, China’s OFDI, host country and home country characteristics, host-home 
country bilateral characteristics and IVs. 
Table 1: Summary statistics (33 OECD countries, 155 host countries, 2003–2009) 
Variable N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
lnOECDOFDIF 9283 3.47 2.90 -3.82 9.74 
lnCOFDIF 7111 2.05 2.47 -4.61 8.48 
Host country characteristics (i) 
    lnRGDP 8958 11.33 2.03 4.78 16.3 
    lnRGDPPC 8958 8.59 1.51 4.42 11.33 
    Technology 8115 0.13 0.13 0 1.00 
    Resources 8026 0.23 0.26 0 1.00 
Home country's characteristics (j) 
    lnRGDP 9235 12.87 1.70 8.86 16.26 
    lnRGDPPC 9235 9.96 0.62 8.31 10.94 
    Technology 9032 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.57 
    Resources 8841 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.75 
Bilateral characteristics (ji)         
    lnExch 7776 1.04 3.46 -8.30 17.78 
    lnArea 9218 24.25 2.89 11.83 32.72 
    Colony 9218 0.07 0.25 0 1 
    Comcol 9198 0.01 0.07 0 1 
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    Comlang 9218 0.10 0.30 0 1 
    Contig 9218 0.05 0.22 0 1 
    lnDist 9218 8.20 1.05 4.09 9.89 
    Smctry 9218 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Instruments           
    lnChinaDist 9283 8.93 0.55 6.73 9.86 
    lnChinaExch 8226 0.05 2.61 -5.15 15.07 
Notes: N = number of observations. S.D. = standard deviation. Values are measured in current prices in 
$ million (OECDOFDIF, COFDIF); in 2000 price US dollar (RGDP, RGDPPC); in percentage 
(Resources, Technology); in units of local currency per OECD country’s and China’s currency (Exch, 
ChinaExch); in KM (ChinaDist, Dist); in KM
2 
(Area); in binary value (Colony, Comcol, Comlang, 
Contig, Smctry). 
Data sources: OECD’s International Direct Investment Statistics, MOFCOM (2009), World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (various years), and CEPII (2010).  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Equation (1) is estimated under various specifications to examine whether and how 
the results vary with different control variables. Table 2 reports the results. 
 
Model 1 in column (1) shows results using the full sample. The main explanatory 
variable, China’s OFDI, is negative and significant at the 1% level. It suggests that a 
10% rise in China’s OFDI causes a 1.64% drop in the OFDI of OECD countries. The 
host country market effect measurements, real GDP and real GDP per capita, are both 
positive and significant at the 1% level. They imply that the OFDI of OECD countries 
is driven by the market-seeking motivation, consistent with Dunning (1993, 1998). 
The home country’s real GDP per capita is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
This reflects the strength of home country to invest overseas as illustrated by Dunning 
(1981, 1995) and Dunning et al. (2001), although the home country’s real GDP is 
positive and insignificant.  
 
The real exchange rate of OECD countries is negative and significant at the 5% level, 
consistent with the findings of existing studies which argue that home country 
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currency depreciation helps overseas investments (Cushman, 1985; Summary and 
Summary, 1995; Goldberg and Klein, 1998). Other bilateral control variables, 
including colonial link, common coloniser, common language and contiguity, all have 
positive and significant effect on the OFDI of OECD countries. This positive effect 
implies that the OFDI of OECD countries is positively correlated with economic 
approximation. The bilateral distance demonstrates a negative and significant effect.   
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Table 2: TSLS estimation using full data sample 
Dependent: Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
lnOECDOFDIF Coefficient S.E.1 Coefficient S.E.1 Coefficient S.E.1 
lnCOFDIF -0.164*** (0.058) -0.373*** (0.073) -0.344*** (0.080)  
         
Host Country Characteristics      
     lnRGDP 0.661*** (0.034) 0.668*** (0.041) 0.697*** (0.055)   
       
     lnRGDPPC 0.248*** (0.031) 0.224*** (0.036) 0.191*** (0.039) 
       
     Technology   2.631*** (0.306) 2.617*** (0.324) 
       
     Resources     0.524**  (0.216) 
           
Home Country Characteristics      
     lnRGDP 1.515 (2.643) 0.613 (3.154) 0.194    (3.317)   
       
     lnRGDPPC 4.452* (2.654) 4.737 (3.182) 4.735    (3.277)   
       
     Technology   1.274 (0.936) 1.458    (0.948)   
       
     Resources     -3.089    (1.909) 
           
Bilateral Characteristics      
     lnExch -0.036** (0.014) -0.044*** (0.016) -0.048*** (0.016)    
       
     lnArea -0.015 (0.021) 0.090*** (0.026) 0.059**  (0.026) 
         
     Colony 0.650*** (0.111) 0.705*** (0.130) 0.675*** (0.130) 
         
     Comcol 2.707*** (0.437) 3.100*** (0.448) 2.996*** (0.450) 
         
     Comlang 0.583*** (0.099) 0.554*** (0.116) 0.543*** (0.117) 
          
     Contig 0.308** (0.137) 0.401*** (0.150) 0.394*** (0.148)    
       
     lnDist -0.720*** (0.043) -0.652*** (0.051) -0.680*** (0.051)   
       
     Smctry 0.388 (0.269) 0.317 (0.301) 0.325    (0.319) 
Number of obs. 5913 5305 5091    
R2 0.845 0.83 0.84 
Endogeneity test 30.86 62.58 46.33 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First stage F-Stat 143.47 110.35 89.39 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 217.78 170.15 141.03 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen J-Stat 0.68 1.38 0.01 
p-value 0.41 0.24 0.97    
Notes: 
1 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes a time trend as well as the 
home country dummy. Significant at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.  
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Model 2 includes host country and home country technology levels apart from those 
included in Model 1. The results strengthen the replacement effect of China’s OFDI 
on OECD’s OFDI, as a 10% rise in the former will now lead to a 3.73% drop in the 
latter. Host country technology level is positive and significant at the 1% level, 
implying a clear technology-seeking motivation, consistent with Driffield and Love 
(2003). In contrast, home country technology level is found to have a positive but 
insignificant effect.  
 
Models 1 and 2 might be mis-specified as they have not considered the effect of 
resource-seeking motivation, which is argued to have a strong effect on China’s OFDI 
decision (Yao, et al., 2010). Model 3 adds both the host country and home country 
resource endowment levels apart from those included in Model 2.  
 
China’s OFDI is still found to have a negative and significant effect at the 1% level 
and its marginal impact on the OFDI of OECD countries is similar to that found in 
Model 2. The additional explanatory variable, host country resource endowment, is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, although home country resource endowment 
is found to have an insignificant effect.  
 
In summary, regression results of the three different specifications of the basic model 
reveal a significant displacement effect of China’s OFDI on the OFDI of OECD 
countries, with a replacement elasticity ranging from 0.164 to 0.373.  
 
The first stage regression result is reported in Table B1 in Appendix B. Although the 
first IV, China’s distance to a third country (lnChinaDist), is negative and significant 
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at the 1% level, the second IV, China’s bilateral real exchange rate (lnChinaExch), is 
positive but insignificant. The insignificance of IV might imply that the finding of the 
displacement effect in Table 2 depends on the validity of IV. To further investigate 
this displacement effect in the following regressions, the whole sample is split by 
using different criteria including host country resource endowment, continental 
location and income level, respectively.  
 
Given the importance of natural resources to China’s OFDI (Yao et al., 2010; Buckley 
et al., 2007), another research question to be asked is whether the displacement effect 
of China’s OFDI on the OFDI of OECD countries in a host country is conditional on 
oil/ore abundance. To answer question, the whole sample is split into oil/ore abundant 
countries and countries that are less abundant in oil/ore.
5
 
 
The variation of displacement effect with oil abundance of a host country is first 
presented in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. For oil abundant countries (column 1), 
interestingly, there is no evidence of displacement effect. The coefficient on China’s 
OFDI is insignificant, meaning that for this group of countries, Chinese overseas 
investments do not displace those of OECD countries. 
 
There are two possible explanations for this result. Firstly, China’s presence in oil 
abundance countries is resisted by the West (Chen, 2008). China’s oil companies are 
unable to penetrate the most easily extractable countries because the West has had a 
                                                 
5
 Oil abundance is defined by the share of oil’s production in GDP. A host country is oil abundant if 
this share exceeds its median value; otherwise, it is less oil abundant. Ore abundance is defined by the 
share of ores and metal exports in merchandise exports, as is in the World Bank World Development 
Indicators. A host country is ore-abundant if this share exceeds its median value.  
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long held dominance. For instance, Saudi Arabia has a very long and close 
relationship with the West and oil plays a significant role in their bilateral relationship.  
 
Secondly, China’s OFDI in other oil-rich countries that have been placed under 
punitive sanction regimes by the West has little impact on the OFDI of OECD 
countries in these particular countries. For instance, Iran has had a poor economic and 
diplomatic relationship with the US since 1979. The Iranian Revolution and the 
Iranian hostage crisis led to mutual enmity in the American–Iranian relationship in all 
areas.  
 
The estimated results for host countries that are less abundant in oil are presented in 
column (2) in Table 3. The results show evidence of a displacement effect, as the 
coefficient on China’s OFDI is negative and significant at the 5% level. This implies 
that a 10% rise in China’s OFDI will cause a drop in the OFDI of OECD countries of 
6.53%. This displacement effect could be explained as the result of market 
competition. The market-seeking motivation drives OFDI from China as well as from 
OECD countries. The displacement effects of China’s OFDI on the OFDI of OECD 
countries in those that are ore-abundant and less-abundant are presented in column (3) 
and (4) in Table 3. The results are not dissimilar to those presented in columns (1) and 
(2) for oil-abundant and oil less-abundant host countries.
6
  
 
Overall, the estimates results in Table 3 indicate that China’s OFDI displaces the 
OFDI of OECD countries in those that are less abundant in natural resources rather 
than those that are resource abundant.  
                                                 
6
 The interpretation of the insignificant displacement in metal abundant countries needs to be treated 
with caution because of the failure to reject the endogeneity test. 
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This finding seems surprising, especially after addressing the importance of China’s 
resource-seeking motivation. The above explanation indicates that the long held 
dominance of the West serves to restrict China’s OFDI in natural resource abundant 
countries. Of course, China’s OFDI might displace the OFDI of certain OECD 
countries, but there is no systematic evidence of a displacement effect in all countries. 
The displacement effect in countries that are less abundant in natural resources could 
be driven by the market-seeking motivation.  
 
The whole sample is alternatively split according to host country incomes and 
continental location in the following regressions to further investigate whether the 
displacement effect varies with other characteristics. The estimations based on these 
two criteria in the following examinations have yielded consistent results because 
these two classifications are closely related. High-income countries are generally 
located in Europe and North America and low-income countries largely exist in 
Africa and Latin America. 
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 report the regression results when the sample is split 
into high- and low-income countries.
7
 The coefficient on China’s OFDI is negative 
and significant at the 1% level, implying that a 10% rise in China’s OFDI will cause a 
5.32% decline in OECD’s OFDI in high-income host countries.  
As an important measure of market effect, the higher level of host country income 
would tend to attract more FDI, be it from China or the OECD. China’s market-
seeking motivation is indirectly reflected in an empirical study claiming that China’s 
                                                 
7
 The income level is measured by real GDP per capita. A host country is a high-income country if this 
value exceeds the median value; otherwise, it is a low-income country. 
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exports displace that of other Asian nations to high-income countries (Greenaway et 
al., 2008). In addition, the importance of market-seeking motivation is jointly 
witnessed by China’s export-oriented economy and a close relationship between 
China’s OFDI and exports.8 Therefore, market competition results in a displacement 
effect of China’s OFDI on that of OECD countries in high-income host countries.  
Column (6) in Table 3 shows the estimation results for low-income host countries. 
They show no evidence of displacement effect. It may suggest that low-income host 
countries may not be attractive to Chinese companies. Less competition between 
China and OECD for their investments may explain why the displacement effect is 
insignificant. 
 
Column (7) in Table 3 shows the estimation results for the host countries located in 
Asia. The displacement effect is significant at the 5% level, implying a 10% rise in 
China’s OFDI will cause a 3.85% drop in Asian OECD countries.  
 
Estimation results for the host countries located in Europe and North America are 
reported in column (9) in Table 3. They imply that the displacement effect is 
significant at the 1% level, meaning that a 10% rise in China’s OFDI will cause a 
3.55% drop in European and North American OECD host countries by the other 
OECD countries. These significant displacement effects coincide with the above-
mentioned argument, whereby the market-seeking motivation drives Chinese and 
OECD countries’ OFDI  to flow into big markets including Asia, Europe and North 
America.  
                                                 
8  
In 2009, the rent and business service industry, the wholesale and retail industry and the 
transportation industry occupied 36.2%, 10.8% and 3.7% of China’s OFDI respectively. Overall, 
50.7% of China’s OFDI was directed to exports-related industries (MOFCOM, 2009). 
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On the contrary, estimations for the host countries located in Africa, Latin America 
and Oceania (column 8, Table 3) do not show any displacement effect. This can be 
explained by the joint effect of resource-seeking and market-seeking motivations 
revealed in columns (1)-(6) in Table 3. Host countries located in these continents, 
especially Africa, are generally acknowledged as low income with abundant resources. 
Motivation of market-seeking is relatively weak compared to resource-seeking for 
Chinese companies. 
 
Besada et al. (2008) suggest that China’s OFDI in Africa focuses primarily on 
obtaining natural resources. Cheung et al. (2011) argue that energy abundance attracts 
Chinese investments in Africa, whereas Western countries have conventionally 
invested relatively small amounts to avoid risk. In contrast, the OECD countries’ 
overseas investments may have been motivated by a need for diversification, which 
explains why China’s presence in Africa and Latin America may have little impact on 
the OECD countries as far as foreign investments are concerned.   
 
In short, the displacement effect is conditional on the host country’s incomes and 
continental location. Market-seeking may drive China’s OFDI flow into high-income, 
Asian, European and North American countries, but there is little evidence of China 
displacing OECD countries’ OFDI in low-income, African, Latin American and 
Oceanian countries.  
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Table 3: The Effects of Host Country’s Characteristics on the Displacement Effect 
Dependent: Natural Resources   Income   Continental Location 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Oil  Metal      Africa+ Europe+ 
  Less   Less      Oceania+  
lnOECDOFDIF Abundant Abundant   Abundant Abundant   High Low   Asia Latin America North America 
lnCOFDIF -0.051 -0.653**   0.151 -1.099***  -0.532*** -0.014   -0.385** -0.058 -0.355*** 
 (0.059) (0.266)     (0.118) (0.192)     (0.165) (0.064)     (0.188) (0.077) (0.111)    
             
Host Country Characteristics            
     lnRGDP 0.437*** 1.144***  0.545*** 1.805***  0.763*** 0.643***  0.738*** 0.940*** 0.858*** 
 (0.043) (0.244)     (0.041) (0.215)     (0.147) (0.041)     (0.071) (0.059) (0.130)    
             
     lnRGDPPC 0.315*** -0.047     0.317*** -0.717***  0.149 0.469***  0.031 0.150** -0.202*   
 (0.040) (0.140)     (0.051) (0.154)     (0.108) (0.057)     (0.095) (0.064) (0.120)    
             
     Technology 1.044*** 1.263*    -0.729* 5.041***  6.348*** 0.419*    3.430*** 0.591 3.962*** 
 (0.267) (0.682)     (0.385) (0.687)     (0.657) (0.250)     (0.573) (0.726) (0.656)    
             
     Resources -1.044*** 5.125***  -0.573** 2.727***  -0.067 -0.269     1.003** -0.113 0.688*   
 (0.162) (1.431)     (0.227) (0.516)     (0.371) (0.203)     (0.415) (0.250) (0.405)    
             
Home Country Characteristics            
     lnRGDP 2.005 -1.233     10.650** -11.500**   -3.938 5.599     7.406 2.093 -5.260    
 (4.130) (5.104)     (4.624) (5.655)     (4.733) (4.470)     (7.401) (5.538) (4.410)    
             
     lnRGDPPC 3.442 4.881     -6.311 16.010***  9.200* -0.448     -0.525 2.693 10.310**  
 (3.957) (5.297)     (4.477) (5.593)     (4.815) (4.360)     (7.227) (5.447) (4.392)    
             
     Technology 2.356** 1.073     2.865** -1.025     2.235* 0.392     -0.186 -1.909 2.918**  
 (1.146) (1.490)     (1.233) (1.538)     (1.255) (1.363)     (2.126) (1.362) (1.229)    
             
     Resources -1.171 -6.312*    -3.738 -0.217     -4.842* -3.567     -2.842 -4.036 -3.353    
 (2.021) (3.552)     (2.366) (3.527)     (2.761) (2.410)     (3.833) (3.735) (2.532)    
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Table 3 (continued) 
Bilateral Characteristics            
     lnExch -0.022 0.024     -0.026 -0.001     -0.191*** -0.016     0.150** -0.098*** -0.054    
 (0.017) (0.052)     (0.026) (0.028)     (0.026) (0.019)     (0.070) (0.025) (0.035)    
             
     lnArea 0.345*** -0.579***  0.047 -0.647***  0.071* 0.002  -0.169*** -0.299*** 0.048   
 (0.051) (0.124)     (0.069) (0.094)     (0.041) (0.047)     (0.051) (0.048) (0.057)    
             
     Colony 0.364** 1.122***  0.584*** 0.981***  0.287 0.598***  -0.519* 1.299*** 0.378*   
 (0.170) (0.214)     (0.179) (0.258)     (0.231) (0.159)     (0.265) (0.208) (0.213)    
             
     Comcol 2.642*** 1.621     2.714*** 2.004**   0.978 2.669***  1.418** dropped 3.443*** 
 (0.538) (1.577)     (0.501) (0.949)     (0.754) (0.567)     (0.686)  (0.610)    
             
     Comlang 0.721*** 0.001     0.503*** 0.554**   0.959*** 0.530***  0.607** 0.416** 0.418**  
 (0.161) (0.173)     (0.128) (0.247)     (0.208) (0.154)     (0.285) (0.194) (0.184)    
             
     Contig 1.104*** 0.237     0.026 0.554**   -0.151 1.521***  -1.012 1.273*** 0.303*   
 (0.269) (0.210)     (0.214) (0.227)     (0.196) (0.286)     (0.666) (0.273) (0.162)    
             
     lnDist -0.983*** -0.777***  -0.987*** -0.617***  -0.454*** -0.821***  -1.142*** -0.212** -0.614*** 
 (0.050) (0.104)     (0.064) (0.081)     (0.119) (0.056)     (0.171) (0.090) (0.084)    
             
     Smctry -0.217 -0.526     -0.650 0.468     1.400*** -1.216     dropped dropped 0.574*   
  (0.467) (0.498)      (0.471) (0.459)      (0.388) (1.124)          (0.329)    
Number of obs. 2790 2301  2468 2623  2528 2563  1285 1505 2301  
R
2
 0.871 0.820  0.875 0.737  0.854 0.826  0.818 0.843 0.879 
Endogeneity test 5.584 14.500  0.000 88.391  26.985 5.683  11.177 8.002 24.384 
p-value 0.018 0.000  0.985 0.000  0.000 0.017  0.001 0.005 0.000 
First stage F-Stat 135.086 11.410  30.050 31.190  20.170 132.800  26.590 75.470 35.280 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 220.274 19.450  55.740 54.600  39.530 206.200  44.720 157.800 58.940 
p-value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J-Stat 0.602 1.575  0.860 0.647  0.132 0.450  0.007 1.733 0.186  
p-value 0.438 0.209   0.354 0.421   0.717 0.502   0.932 0.188 0.666  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes a time trend as well as the home country dummy. Significant at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. Smctry 
and Comcol were dropped in columns (7) and (8) because of the collinearities. 
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5 Robustness checks 
 
Two robustness checks were undertaken to examine the sensitivity of results to 
various aspects including the involvement of SARs as destinations and the estimation 
period before the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
Two special administrative regions (SARs), Hong Kong and Macao, are excluded 
from the previous estimations because they are acknowledged as tax havens and 
investments of OECD countries in these destinations may suffer from the ‘round-
tripping’ problem. However, China’s OFDI skews towards SARs because of the 
historical relations between them. The exclusion of SARs may lead to biased 
estimates of the displacement effect.  
 
Column (1) in Table 4 presents the estimation result with inclusion of SARs as 
destinations, but the coefficient on China’s OFDI is still found to be negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
The sample period 2003-2009 includes two years of the world financial crisis, 2008 
and 2009. The financial crisis was initially triggered by the US subprime crisis and 
rapidly spread to the world and substantially changed the global economic landscape. 
For example, the OFDI of OECD countries contracted sharply by 18% and 47% in 
2008 and 2009, respectively. In contrast, China’s OFDI expanded by 111% and 1%, 
respectively.
9
  
 
                                                 
9
 The growth rates were calculated by the authors. Data for the OECD countries’ OFDI were obtained 
from the UNCTAD World Investment Report (various issues). Data for China’s OFDI were obtained 
from the MOFCOM (2009).  
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To examine the effect of the crisis on China’s OFDI, the dataset for 2003-2007 was 
re-estimated this time excluding the observations for 2008-2009. The results do not 
alter the sign and statistical significance of the main variable of interest, and the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient is also similar (column (3), Table 4). 
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Table 5: Results of the Robustness Checks 
Dependent:   Including SARs   Pre-Crisis 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
lnOECDOFDIF   Coefficient S.E.
1
   Coefficient S.E.
1
 
lnCOFDIF  -0.111*** (0.039)     -0.422*** (0.102)    
       
Host Country Characteristics      
     lnRGDP  0.622*** (0.042)     0.675*** (0.063)    
       
     lnRGDPPC  0.195*** (0.035)     0.235*** (0.044)    
       
     Technology  1.871*** (0.236)     3.303*** (0.409)    
       
     Resources  0.111    (0.158)     0.604**  (0.270)    
       
Home Country Characteristics      
     lnRGDP  0.734    (3.048)     1.736    (4.606)    
       
     lnRGDPPC  4.150    (3.011)     1.362    (4.582)    
       
     Technology  1.698*   (0.890)     1.342    (1.081)    
       
     Resources  -3.087*   (1.728)     -3.918    (3.074)    
       
Bilateral Characteristics      
     lnExch  -0.065*** (0.014)     -0.026    (0.021)    
       
     lnArea  -0.015    (0.023)     0.117*** (0.031)    
       
     Colony  0.593*** (0.120)     0.799*** (0.149)    
       
     Comcol  2.590*** (0.512)     3.142*** (0.490)    
       
     Comlang  0.517*** (0.103)     0.357*** (0.130)    
       
     Contig  0.319**  (0.138)     0.725*** (0.169)    
       
     lnDist  -0.744*** (0.040)     -0.657*** (0.058)    
       
     Smctry  0.392    (0.279)     -0.109    (0.377)    
Number of obs.   5,207      4,071 
R
2
  0.86  0.82 
Endogeneity test  46.69  39.04 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
First stage F-Stat  251.83  57.49 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 302.80  91.56 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
Hansen J-Stat  0.08  0.04 
p-value   0.77   0.84 
Notes: 
1
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes a time trend as well as the 
home country dummy. Significant at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
This study examines whether and how rapid growth of China’s OFDI displaces 
OECD countries’ OFDI in a third host country. A panel dataset is constructed 
covering OFDI flows from 33 OECD countries to 155 host countries during 2003–
2009. A basic gravity model is also constructed to estimate the effects of China’s 
OFDI on OECD countries’ OFDI with various specifications, including different sets 
of control variables. A TSLS method is used for the estimation of the empirical 
models. 
 
It further investigates whether and how this displacement effect varies across host 
country characteristics, such as resource abundance, incomes and continental location.  
 
The empirical results suggest that China’s OFDI displaces the OFDI of OECD 
countries in general. Depending on IV validity, a 10% rise in China’s OFDI reduces 
that of OECD countries by 3.4% in a third host country. However, this displacement 
effect responds differently to a host country’s characteristics. In particular, there are 
significant displacement effects in less resource abundant, higher income host 
countries and those located in Asia, Europe and North America, but not in resource 
abundant, low-income countries and those located in Africa or Latin America. The 
latter findings of these insignificant displacement effects contrast with the often cited 
argument that China’s investments in these countries are driven by a ‘new 
colonialism’, where China aims to crowd out Western investors. 
  
 34 
An important implication of this study in the understanding of China’s overseas 
investments is that China displaces the OECD countries’ investments in general. 
However, China’s overseas investments do not undermine the investments of OECD 
countries in resource abundant, low income, African or Latin American host countries. 
Therefore, a more transparent OFDI policy and more government level cooperation 
would be helpful in clarifying the anxiety surrounding Chinese OFDI and in removing 
the perception that Chinese OFDI is a threat to the existing interests of other countries 
or that it will cause disorder in the world economy. In reality, China’s OFDI is driven 
by common motivations and Chinese capital provides an opportunity to sustain global 
economic growth and to achieve mutual benefits. 
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Appendix A: Host Countries and Home Countries List 
 
Table A1: List of Host Countries 
1 Afghanistan  55 Ghana  109 Papua New Guinea  
2 Albania  56 Greece  110 Paraguay  
3 Algeria  57 Grenada  111 Peru  
4 Angola  58 Guinea  112 Philippines  
5 Argentina  59 Guyana  113 Poland  
6 Australia  60 Honduras  114 Qatar  
7 Austria  61 Hungary  115 Romania  
8 Azerbaijan  62 India  116 Russia  
9 Bahamas  63 Indonesia  117 Rwanda  
10 Bahrain  64 Iran  118 Samoa  
11 Bangladesh  65 Iraq  119 Saudi Arabia  
12 Barbados  66 Ireland  120 Senegal  
13 Belarus  67 Israel  121 Seychelles  
14 Belgium  68 Italy  122 Sierra Leone  
15 Belize  69 Jamaica  123 Singapore  
16 Benin  70 Japan  124 Slovakia  
17 Bermuda  71 Jordan  125 South Africa  
18 Bolivia  72 Kazakhstan  126 South Korea  
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina  73 Kenya  127 Spain  
20 Botswana  74 Kuwait  128 Sri Lanka  
21 Brazil  75 Kyrgyzstan  129 St. Vincent & Grenadines 
22 Brunei  76 Laos  130 Sudan  
23 Bulgaria  77 Latvia  131 Suriname  
24 Burundi  78 Lebanon  132 Sweden  
25 Cambodia  79 Lesotho  133 Switzerland  
26 Cameroon  80 Liberia  134 Syrian Arab Rep 
27 Canada  81 Libyan 135 Taiwan Province  
28 Cape Verde  82 Liechtenstein  136 Tajikistan  
29 Chad  83 Luxembourg  137 Tanzania  
30 Chile  84 Madagascar  138 Thailand  
31 Colombia  85 Malawi  139 Timor-Leste 
32 Congo  86 Malaysia  140 Togo  
33 Congo DR  87 Mali  141 Tunisia  
34 Cote d'lvoire 88 Malta  142 Turkey  
35 Croatia  89 Marshall  143 Turkmenistan  
36 Cuba  90 Mauritania  144 Uganda  
37 Cyprus  91 Mauritius  145 Ukraine  
38 Czech Republic  92 Mexico  146 United Arab Emirates  
39 Denmark  93 Mongolia  147 United Kingdom  
40 Djibouti  94 Morocco  148 United States  
41 Dominican Republic  95 Mozambique  149 Uruguay  
42 Ecuador  96 Myanmar  150 Uzbekistan  
43 Egypt  97 Namibia  151 Venezuela  
44 Equator Guinea 98 Nepal  152 Vietnam  
45 Eritrea  99 Netherlands  153 Yemen  
46 Ethiopia  100 New Zealand  154 Zambia  
47 Federal St. Micronesia 101 Niger  155 Zimbabwe  
48 Fiji  102 Nigeria    
49 Finland  103 North Korea    
50 France  104 Norway    
51 Gabon  105 Oman    
52 Gambia  106 Pakistan    
53 Georgia  107 Palau    
54 Germany  108 Panama      
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Table A2: List of Home Countries 
1 Australia 
2 Austria 
3 Belgium 
4 Canada 
5 Chile 
6 Czech Republic 
7 Denmark 
8 Estonia 
9 Finland  
10 France 
11 Germany 
12 Greece 
13 Hungary 
14 Iceland 
15 Ireland 
16 Israel 
17 Italy 
18 Japan 
19 Luxembourg 
20 Netherlands 
21 New Zealand 
22 Norway 
23 Poland 
24 Portugal 
25 Slovakia 
26 Slovenia 
27 South Korea 
28 Spain 
29 Sweden 
30 Switzerland 
31 Turkey 
32 United Kingdom 
33 United States 
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Appendix B: First Stage Estimations of TSLS 
 
Table B1: First Stage Estimation of TSLS for the Whole Sample 
Dependent: Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
lnCOFDIF Coefficient S.E.1 Coefficient S.E.1 Coefficient S.E.1 
Host Country Characteristics      
     lnRGDP 0.239*** (0.028) 0.252*** (0.031) 0.427*** (0.032) 
       
     lnRGDPPC 0.175*** (0.035) 0.155*** (0.038) 0.005 (0.039) 
       
     Technology   0.805*** (0.276) 1.173*** (0.277) 
       
     Resources     1.995*** (0.127) 
         
Home Country Characteristics      
     lnRGDP 0.984 (2.580) 3.380 (2.935) 1.128 (3.039) 
       
     lnRGDPPC -0.463 (2.652) -3.063 (3.023) -1.778 (3.081) 
       
     Technology   -0.549 (0.798) -0.683 (0.801) 
       
     Resources     -0.429 (1.900) 
           
Bilateral Characteristics      
     lnExch -0.045 (0.339) -0.030 (0.407) -0.159 (0.483) 
       
     lnArea 0.296*** (0.024) 0.291*** (0.025) 0.146*** (0.027) 
       
     Colony 0.243** (0.118) 0.392*** (0.130) 0.370*** (0.127) 
       
     Comcol 1.028** (0.471) 0.871* (0.511) 0.574 (0.471) 
       
     Comlang 0.441*** (0.110) 0.450*** (0.120) 0.482*** (0.119) 
       
     Contig 0.341** (0.149) 0.337** (0.151) 0.323** (0.146) 
       
     lnDist 0.490*** (0.035) 0.509*** (0.035) 0.455*** (0.035) 
       
     Smctry -0.088 (0.344) -0.090 (0.343) -0.178 (0.341) 
       
Excluded Instrument Variables      
     lnChinaDist -0.900*** (0.053) -0.872*** (0.059) -0.788*** (0.059) 
       
     lnChinaExch 0.084 (0.339) 0.053 (0.408) 0.172 (0.483) 
F test of excluded instruments      143.470           110.350           89.390 
p-value 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Notes: 
1 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes a time trend as well as the 
home country dummy. Significant at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.  
 
 
